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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2018 opinion in Ohio v. American Express
Co.1 is among the most important—and divisive—antitrust opinions
in the modern era of antitrust law. The simplest statement of Justice
Thomas’s opinion for the majority is that it saw a five Justice majority
of the Court fully embrace the relatively new economic understanding
of two-sided markets. Supporters of the majority opinion almost uni-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
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pants in that symposium for their helpful discussion of this project. Justin Mc-
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1. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
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formly view it as an obviously correct application of important and
generally accepted recent development in economic theory. Those
more amenable to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion do not necessa-
rily reject the theory of two-sided markets, but instead would treat
arguments premised on this theory as a pro-competitive justification
(that is, a defense) to what could reasonably be understood as poten-
tially anti-competitive conduct under prevailing antitrust economics.
The central argument of this Article is that both perspectives miss
the forest for the trees. The Court’s American Express opinion is not
narrowly about whether (or how) antitrust law should embrace the
theory of two-sided markets. Rather, I argue that this opinion is part
of the Court’s ongoing efforts to understand how antitrust law should
evaluate markets that are not neatly “horizontal” or “vertical.”
I call these efforts to understand competition in markets that are
not clearly horizontal or vertical “post-Cartesian” antitrust, and de-
scribe these markets as “messy markets.” At least at this moment in
time, the broadest class of these markets are what are typically
thought of as platforms. Some of the Court’s post-Cartesian cases,
however, do not involve what would ordinarily be thought of as plat-
forms. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of post-Cartesian an-
titrust is that these messy markets often defy simple classification.
Under this telling, antitrust law is currently undergoing a period
of evolution comparable in importance to the period following the
Court’s embrace of Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox and the consumer
welfare standard in the 1970s. The adoption of the consumer welfare
standard saw a rejection of the previously ascendant structure, con-
duct, performance (SCP) paradigm of market analysis as an overly
simplistic model that did not describe many actual markets, and that
was particularly inapposite to markets generally of interest to anti-
trust law.2 The subsequent decade saw the development and adoption
of a relatively robust framework for evaluating the competitive effects
of conduct that eschewed market structure. It instead based itself
upon consumer welfare analysis and constrained itself by market defi-
nition and error cost analysis.
While relatively robust, the tools and heuristics used by this
framework have largely developed along the orthogonal axes of hori-
zontal and vertical competition. These rules have served the market
and American consumer exceptionally well for the past forty years.
But the important antitrust cases today do not fit neatly into the mold
2. Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem for
a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 293, 311 (2019) (discussing the recognition by economists, courts, and gov-
ernment agencies that the SPC paradigm of market analysis lacks empirical sup-
port, and the subsequent adoption of approaches that recognize the limits of
market structure information).
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of either horizontal or vertical conduct. Perhaps this is because the
certainty provided by clear antitrust law reduces the incidence of liti-
gation or perhaps because the changing technologies of the market-
place have given rise to more complicated market structures—
regardless the cause, simple horizontal or vertical market structures
are not often the subject of antitrust litigation today. We see this in
cases ranging from Apple Inc. v. Pepper (and the earlier Apple e-books
litigation),3 to the AT&T-Time Warner merger litigation, from Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,4 to Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Actavis, Inc.,5 and of course in American Express.6 Indeed,
the market structures in these cases are so different from horizontal
and vertical markets that the tools developed for analysis of horizon-
tal and vertical markets are as inapposite to them as SCP methodolo-
gies are to markets for differentiated products, markets characterized
by rapid innovation, entry, or network effect, and high fixed costs. In
other words, in light of the messy markets that dominate contempo-
rary antitrust litigation, the established horizontal/vertical competi-
tion paradigm is the modern equivalent of SCP, which are too
structurally simplistic and too reliant on simple heuristics to be rele-
vant to messy markets.
Antitrust law is currently struggling to address competition con-
cerns that may arise in messy markets. This is a good thing: we gener-
ally expect litigation to arise in areas least settled by existing law, and
that over time this litigation will clarify that law. Although this au-
thor believes that the Court generally, and in American Express in
particular, is charting a good path through these markets, it is none-
theless reasonable to acknowledge that it is possible that antitrust
law may not be up to the challenge of addressing competitive concerns
in all messy markets. To the extent that is the case, the appropriate
response is to consider market-specific regulations to address concerns
that may arise. This contrasts with proposals that would distort ex-
isting antitrust law, which has been overwhelmingly effective in ad-
dressing concerns in horizontal and vertical markets, to chase after
the edge conditions that may arise in certain messy markets.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II provides a brief over-
view of the American Express opinion and situates it in recent anti-
trust case law, arguing that most recent high-profile antitrust
litigation involves messy, post-Cartesian markets. Part III looks at
how competition occurs in these markets, and demonstrates how prop-
3. Pepper v. Apple Inc., (In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.), 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir.
2017), cert. granted sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018), aff’d
sub. nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
4. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
5. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
6. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
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erly understanding the competitive dynamics of these markets can
help to avoid both false positive and false negatives. Part IV turns
back to the American Express opinion to argue not only that it was
correct on its own terms but that it was the necessary outcome for
antitrust law to continue to develop and be relevant to modern
markets.
II. SITUATING AMERICAN EXPRESS
This Part provides a brief overview of the American Express opin-
ion and situates it in recent antitrust case law, arguing that most re-
cent high-profile antitrust litigation involves messy, post-Cartesian
markets.
A. Different Sides of the American Express Opinion
The majority’s opinion in American Express clearly understands it-
self as being about the treatment of two-sided markets in antitrust
law. It devotes significant effort to explaining the theory of two-sided
markets and explaining that the credit card business is such a mar-
ket.7 The Court flatly rejects petitioners’ case on the ground that it is
staked entirely on the effects on a single side of this market.8 Using
the logic of two-sided markets, the Court rejects every effort petition-
ers make to directly demonstrate anti-competitive effects.9 The Court
clearly accepted respondent’s characterization of the question
presented by the case: that in two-sided markets the demonstration of
seemingly anti-competitive effects on one side of a two-sided market is
insufficient to make out a prima facie case under the rule of reason.10
Yet for all the discussion of two-sided markets—leading up to the
case, in the Court’s opinion, and in subsequent analysis and discus-
sion of the opinion—the two-sidedness of the market is surprisingly
irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. Rather, the deciding factor in the
case was that the market in question is subject to substantial indirect
network effects (which were excluded by the district court decision
and plaintiffs’ arguments). The Court also went to lengths to note that
the credit card market is a specific type of two-sided market (a “trans-
action platform”) such that the Court’s conclusions in the American
Express opinion may not apply to other types of two-sided markets.11
In other words, the Court’s analysis applies both more broadly and
narrowly than just to two-sided markets.
7. Id. at 2280–82, 2285–87.
8. Id. at 2287.
9. Id. at 2287–90.
10. Id. at 2285–86.
11. Id.
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1. Two-Sided Markets
It is hard to imagine that anyone reading this Article is not famil-
iar with the economic theory of two-sided markets. Some definition of
the concept is nonetheless necessary. The concept of two-sided mar-
kets is still relatively new in the economics literature. It is perhaps
most closely associated with Rochet & Tirole’s 2003 article Platform
Competition in Two-Sided Markets—work that contributed in signifi-
cant part to Tirole receiving the 2014 Nobel prize in economics.12
The general idea of a two-sided market it is made up of one or more
firms (frequently referred to as platforms) that coordinate interactions
between two or more distinct but related groups of consumers. The
concept is readily explained by examples. Newspapers and other ad-
vertising-supported media are a classic example. Newspaper publish-
ers sell their product to both readers and advertisers. Readers buy
newspapers from the publisher; advertisers buy space in the papers
from the publisher. The readers benefit from the advertisers because
ads subsidize the cost of the newspaper, while advertisers benefit from
the readers because they are the target audience for the ads. As an-
other example, mobile phone operating systems (and, for that matter,
any computer operating system) are platforms that bring computer
users and application developers together. Programmers choose to
write applications for specific operating systems based in part on how
many users that operating system has, and users choose devices based
in part on the applications available for the platform.
This brief description leads to a few important observations. First,
one of the most important functions of platforms in two-sided markets
is to balance the usage of the platform by both sides of the market. A
newspaper with too many ads is undesirable for readers; one with too
few may be too expensive for its readers. An operating system with no
users will not attract application developers; an operating system with
too few applications will not attract users. Based on these dynamics,
platforms often face chicken-and-egg problems and challenges of un-
raveling. It can be difficult to start a new platform because neither
side will want to join until the other is already there. Likewise, an
established platform that miscalibrates the balance between sides can
quickly unravel (consider a newspaper that loses a few anchor adver-
tisers, which forces an increase in subscription prices, reducing read-
ership, and making the platform less attractive to advertisers).
Prices are the most important tool that platforms use to manage
the balance in usage between sides. Very often these prices take the
form of subsidies. Many newspapers and other ad-supported media
are given away to users for free. Some operating system platforms dis-
12. See generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-
Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003).
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tribute their programming tools to developers for free or may even of-
fer training. In other cases, the platform may impose higher costs on
developers to ensure a better experience for its users.
Credit card markets are one of the classic examples of a two-sided
market.13 The basic story of credit cards as a two-sided market is that
in order for consumers to adopt a credit card, there must be a suffi-
cient number of merchants accepting that card and, conversely, in or-
der for merchants to accept a card there must be a sufficient number
of users using that card. Credit card providers, therefore, face a
chicken-and-egg problem: the need to attract a sufficient number of
users on one side of the market in order to develop users on the other
side of the market. As in most two-sided markets, this has generally
been done by cross-subsidizing one side of the market from the other
side. In the case of the credit card industry, credit card processors
have generally charged merchants a relatively (to marginal cost) high
transaction fee, which they use to subsidize the cost of credit offered to
consumers (e.g., through rewards and no-fee cards).
2. The American Express Opinion
The dispute in American Express arises out of the mandatory “anti-
steering” provision in American Express’s agreement for merchants
joining its network.14 This provision prohibits merchants from sug-
gesting to customers that they pay with a card other than an Ameri-
can Express card (that is, from “steering” customers to another
payment option). American Express generally charges merchants
among the highest transaction fees when processing payments (ap-
proximately 2.5%–3.54% of the transaction amount, as opposed, for
instance, to the 1.5%–2.5% fee charged by Visa and MasterCard
networks).15
The plaintiffs in the American Express litigation argue that this
anti-steering provision amounts to a price restraint that increases
prices charged by merchants to consumers and therefore necessarily
harms consumers who are required to pay a higher price than they
would pay if merchants could encourage them to pay with a different
card.16 Both plaintiffs and the district court argue this as a matter of
economic theory and that it is supported by direct evidence of consum-
ers paying higher prices and therefore experiencing economic harm.17
13. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37
RAND J. ECON. 645, 660–61 (2006).
14. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2283.
15. Liz Smith, Why Isn’t American Express Accepted at More Places?, SMARTASSET
(June 27, 2018), https://smartasset.com/credit-cards/american-express-not-accep
ted [https://perma.unl.edu/ZC6S-2YWN].
16. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2288.
17. Id. at 2283.
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In particular, the district court and dissenting opinion argue that the
anti-steering provision interferes with the ordinary functioning of the
price-setting mechanism.18 The district court and dissenting opinion
rely heavily on the facts that this provision hampered Discover’s abil-
ity to enter the credit card market by offering merchants lower trans-
action fees and that American Express increased its transaction fees
twenty times over a five-year period without appreciable loss of mar-
ket share.19
Importantly, the theory of two-sided markets is not dispositive as
to whether the anti-steering provision is anti-competitive. Rather, it
explains the dynamics of two-sided markets and makes clear that pro-
visions such as the anti-steering provision may serve pro-competitive
purposes. This frames the core issue in the American Express case,
including the central disagreement between the majority and dissent-
ing opinions: whether under the “rule of reason” the burden is on the
plaintiff, ab initio, to demonstrate anti-competitive harm taking into
account all relevant sides of a given market, or whether the plaintiff’s
initial burden can be met by demonstrating conduct that would be
anti-competitive in a single side of a market but two-sided dynamics
can then be used by the defendant to demonstrate offsetting pro-com-
petitive rationale for the conduct.20
While this dispute was framed in terms of whether consideration of
two-sided dynamics belongs in the prima facie case of anti-competitive
effects or in the rebutting defense of procompetitive justifications
under the rule of reason, the reality is that this was just an argument
on which to hang the sides’ respective views about competition in the
credit card industry—and, more generally, the risk tolerance of each
side for error. Under the majority’s view, and for reasons discussed in
Part III, the credit card industry is robustly competitive, which neces-
sarily gives lie to any argument that its structure and practices should
be deemed anti-competitive at all, let alone be relegated to a justifica-
tion defense. Under the dissent’s view, firms should not receive the
benefit of the doubt: practices that have even a superficial appearance
of anticompetitive effect should bear a stiff burden of demonstrating
convincingly that such conduct is justified.
This difference is seen in the language that the majority and dis-
senting opinions use to describe the stages of the rule of reason analy-
sis. The majority requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “a substantial
18. Id. at 2294 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2293–94.
20. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§ 15.02[B] (4th ed. 2017) (discussing the standard three-step approach to rule of
reason analysis); see also Michael Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 AN-
TITRUST 50 (2019) (discussing the standard rule of reason and arguing that it in
practice comprises four steps).
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anticompetitive effect that harms consumers,” whereas Justice
Breyer’s dissent only requires showing conduct that “has had, or is
likely to have, anticompetitive effects.”21 In describing the second
stage, where a defendant rebuts such anti-competitive effects by show-
ing a pro-competitive justification, the majority says that the defen-
dant need only demonstrate a “procompetitive rationale,” whereas
Justice Breyer characterizes this stage as requiring demonstrating
“that the restraint in fact serves a legitimate objective.”22
Error costs are a central tenet of contemporary antitrust law. First
given name in the antitrust canon by Judge Easterbrook, the decision-
theoretic error costs framework has been central to the Roberts
Court’s antitrust jurisprudence.23 The one-sentence explanation of
this framework is that because the market can correct judicial failures
to correct anti-competitive conduct (enforcement false negatives), but
harm to markets resulting from judicial decisions to intervene in mar-
kets where intervention is unwarranted can only be remedied by legis-
lation or subsequent litigation (enforcement false positives), courts
should err on the side of non-intervention except where intervention is
clearly warranted. The majority opinion in American Express clearly
follows this model; Justice Breyer’s dissent, on the other hand,
reverses these burdens, erring in favor of enforcement and placing a
stiff burden on defendants to prove that enforcement is unwarranted.
B. The Real Issue Is Messy, Not Two-Sided, Markets
Much of the discussion following the American Express opinion has
focused on what it means for future litigants and, in particular, how
cases involving (potentially) two-sided markets should be pled.24
21. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2284, 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The comparison between
these competing passages of the majority and dissenting opinions was first
brought to my attention in Andrew I. Gavil & Jordan L. Ludwig, The Many Sides
of Ohio v. American Express Co., 33 ANTITRUST 8 (2018), though that piece does
not recognize the relevance of these differences to the error costs discussion.
22. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2284, 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 415).
23. Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 199 (2014);
Thomas Lambert & Alden Abbott, Recognizing the Limits of Antitrust: The Rob-
erts Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 791
(2015).
24. Hal Singer, Ohio v. American Express: Do Monopoly Platforms Deserve Special
Treatment Under Antitrust?, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/washingtonbytes/2018/02/27/do-monopoly-platforms-deserve-special-treat
ment-under-antitrust-review-of-ohio-v-american-express/#3f4b4ec65b1d [https://
perma.unl.edu/3MYA-AXRC]; Greg Stohr & David McLaughlin, American Ex-
press Case Could Shield Tech Giants from Antitrust Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (June
25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-25/u-s-supreme-
court-backs-american-express-on-credit-card-suit-jiucffg9 [https://perma.unl.edu/
4GZZ-YTBN].
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Randy Picker, for instance, has asked whether plaintiffs now need to
identify whether a given market is horizontal, vertical, or two-sided.25
Many writers, generally those falling into what in contemporary par-
lance is referred to as the “hipster” school of antitrust, have expressed
concern that American Express establishes an impossible burden of
pleading.26 Others express concern that the Court’s analysis excludes
two-sided markets that are not “transactional,” such that the plain-
tiff’s pleading burden is not only to demonstrate harm under a two-
sided analysis (or that a market is not two-sided), but must differenti-
ate between markets that are relevantly two-sided.27
This is all a great big mess. This mess results from the framing of
the American Express case as being squarely about two-sided markets.
The American Express case is better understood in terms of the
Court’s ongoing efforts to address markets that do not fall neatly into
the standard horizontal/vertical dichotomy—that is, messy markets.
In this light, there are two the relevant takeaways from this case.
First, and narrowly, plaintiffs need to account for relatively strong in-
direct network effects when alleging anti-competitive conduct.28 And,
and more importantly, is that plaintiffs bear the burden of accounting
fully for the dynamics of novel or messy market structures.
This conclusion is not surprising (its correctness will be addressed
in Parts III and IV), as it is the basic approach that antitrust law has
taken in complex cases. The best two examples of this are the Court’s
opinions in Actavis and Leegin.29 Both of these cases involved conduct
that could be interpreted as price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act—conduct that is presumptively illegal and subject to per
se condemnation under the Sherman Act.30 In both cases, however,
the Court found that the alleged conduct needed to be reviewed under
25. Washington Bytes, Will the Supreme Court’s Amex Decision Shield Dominant
Tech Platforms from Antitrust Scrutiny?, FORBES (July 18, 2018), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2018/07/18/antitrust-enforcement-of-domi
nant-tech-platforms-in-the-post-american-express-world/#56541ea92f76 [https://
perma.unl.edu/6C7S-N6NC].
26. A concern that is taken up, if briefly, and rejected below.
27. Jonathan Jacobson & Daniel Weick, U.S. Supreme Court Tackles Two-Sided
Markets: Ohio v. American Express, JD SUPRA (June 27, 2018), https://www.jd-
supra.com/legalnews/u-s-supreme-court-tackles-two-sided-75198/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/9KSJ-QMNB].
28. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018) (“Most relevant here, two-
sided platforms often exhibit what economists call ‘indirect network effects.’”); Id.
at 2286 (“A market should be treated as one sided when the impacts of indirect
network effects and relative pricing in that market are minor.”).
29. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013); Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
30. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147–48; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887.
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the more permissive rule of reason, requiring that reviewing courts
consider pro-competitive justifications proffered by defendants.31
Both cases present interesting industry structures that are more
complicated than traditional horizontal or vertical markets. Leegin in-
volves the practice of resale price maintenance (RPM), where manu-
facturers prohibit retailers who sell their products from pricing them
below a specified minimum price.32 This has the hallmarks of price
fixing and—as with the concerns animating the dissent in American
Express—seems to interfere with the basic operation of the price
mechanism. The Leegin court, however, accepted longstanding eco-
nomic theory that explains that this sort of price restraint can in fact
facilitate (or even be necessary for) non-price competition.33
From the present perspective, the more interesting aspect of
Leegin is that it involved what may be called indirect competition.
Leegin competes with other firms in the market for leather apparel
and attempts to differentiate itself from its competitors by offering
both higher quality products and service to consumers.34 Their
higher-end identity requires that the company be able to ensure its
retail partners provide high quality customer service. Leegin therefore
is competing for customers indirectly through its retailers, and its con-
trol over those retailers affects consumer demand for its products.
This is not a two-sided market, but it is characterized by somewhat
similar dynamics in which a firm needs to coordinate the conduct of
one part of the market in order to attract the business of another part
of the market.
Similarly, in Actavis the Court (with Justice Breyer writing for the
majority) held that reverse-payment settlements, in which patent
owners payed firms authorized under patent law to bring a competing
drug to market, are to be evaluated under the rule of reason.35 This
result is surprising because a monopolist paying a competitor to stay
out of the market is about as naked a restraint of trade as one can
imagine. The Court still recognized that these markets, intermediated
as they are by an exceptionally complicated area of patent law, are
exceptionally messy.36
We see similar dynamics in other contemporary high-profile anti-
trust cases. The recent Apple Inc. v. Pepper opinion, for instance, in-
volves the application of the indirect purchaser rule to the Apple App
31. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148–49; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899.
32. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 883–84.
33. Id. at 889–92.
34. Id. at 882–84.
35. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147–48.
36. Id. at 159–60, 176–77 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the pervasive pat-
ent law backdrop in these markets should displace antitrust law entirely).
374 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:364
Store, which is another example of a classic two-sided market.37 Al-
though Pepper was not framed in terms of two-sided markets, the
Court’s discussion of the role of direct vs. indirect relationships be-
tween buyers and sellers has echoes of the complexities of analyzing
competitive effects multi-sided markets.38 The D.C. Circuit review of
the District Court for the District of Columbia’s rejection of the De-
partment of Justice’s efforts to block AT&T’s acquisition of Time
Warner is another case that involves a messy market. The Depart-
ment of Justice litigated that case before the District Court as a
straightforward challenge to a vertical merger in a single, clearly-de-
fined market (multichannel video distribution).39 But AT&T and Time
Warner (the merging firms) successfully defended against the Depart-
ment of Justice’s claim, framing the plaintiff’s case as failing to appre-
ciate the changing dynamics of that market.40 AT&T framed the
merger as ensuring AT&T access to content necessary for it to success-
fully compete in this rapidly changing market.41 In this new market
environment, the merged company is not just competing with firms in
the multichannel video distribution market—they are competing with
myriad firms in the online video distribution market, both as AT&T
becomes one such firm and those firms attempt to compete against
AT&T.
Perhaps most telling, if we look at many of the biggest—and to this
day most controversial—antitrust cases in history, we find a series of
cases that are more complicated than antitrust economics’ traditional
characterization of markets as horizontal or vertical. Microsoft, the
break-up of AT&T, IBM—these all involve businesses simultaneously
participating in multiple markets, each attempting to structure their
business in certain segments in order to more effectively compete in
37. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204, 2019 WL 2078087 (U.S. May 13, 2019).
38. Id., Slip Op. at 6 (discussing iPhone users purchasing apps produced by develop-
ers and distributed through the App Store not as part of a vertical supply distri-
bution, but as instead directly purchasing apps from Apple). See also Geoffrey A.
Manne & Kristian Stout, The Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine After Ohio v. Amex
and the Apple v. Pepper Decision that Should Have Been, 98 NEB. L. REV. 425
(2019) (discussing the structure of the iPhone and App Store market).
39. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp.3d 161, 243 (D.D.C. 2018).
40. Id. at 244–45. See also id. at 163 (“If there ever were an antitrust case where the
parties had a dramatically different assessment of the current state of the rele-
vant market and a fundamentally different vision of its future development, this
is the one.”).
41. Id. at 181–82 (“defendants view the proposed merger as an essential response to
. . . the increasing importance of web- and mobile-based content offerings; the
explosion in targeted, digital advertising; and the limitations attendant with
AT&T’s and Time Warner’s respective business models. . . . By acquiring Time
Warner, AT&T executives testified, the company will immediately gain access to
high-quality content and an extensive advertising inventory.”).
2019] AMEX AND POST-CARTESIAN ANTITRUST 375
others. Each of these firms could be characterized as what today we
call a platform.42
C. The Many Messes of Modern Markets
The preceding discussion suggests both that American Express is
part of an increasing number of cases struggling with messy markets
and also that many of the most important cases in the canon of anti-
trust law are predecessors to this struggle. This raises a pair of re-
lated questions about antitrust law. First, if many of the defining
cases of the field relate to the problem of messy markets, to what ex-
tent are messy markets a central focus of antitrust law? And second, if
these challenges are demanding increased antitrust attention, is there
a reason for this increase?
To the first question, I would argue that the incidence of major an-
titrust cases demonstrates that these cases are not a central focus of
antitrust law. At the same time, I would also argue that these cases
demonstrate that antitrust law has proven exceptionally good at ad-
dressing its core focus of preserving competition in simpler horizontal
and vertical markets. The simplest explanation for this view is to cite
the Priest-Klein hypothesis.43 Whether putatively anti-competitive
conduct is actually anti-competitive is sufficiently clear in most cases
that either no litigation is ever brought or the parties to the litigation
settle.44 The only cases, therefore, that are litigated are those where
the outcome is unclear. This resolves most cases involving horizontal
or vertical conduct, leaving cases involving messy markets as a pre-
dominant source of high-profile antitrust litigation.
It is unclear whether antitrust law will ever delineate a clear set of
antitrust rules for messy markets. It could be that these messy mar-
ket cases are sufficiently complex that a coherent set of predictable
antitrust rules will not emerge. But it also could be that these cases
will remain rare enough and the rule of reason framework will prove
sufficiently flexible to address the concerns that arise in these cases
through litigation of sequential claims, each of which proves over time
to be sui generis. It is also possible that the courts could effectively
push these cases out of the antitrust litigation path—and, surely, the
many commentators today who lament the death of antitrust would
say that this is well on the way to happening. On the other hand, it is
possible that the courts will develop a coherent set of heuristics and
42. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
43. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Daniel Klerman, The Priest-Klein Hy-
potheses: Proofs, Generality and Extensions, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59 (2016).
44. George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on
U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 971, 1007 (2007)
(Indicating that about 97% of all potential antitrust litigations are settled).
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inferences that ultimately provide some level of certainty for under-
standing the likely outcomes in these cases.45
Regardless, it would be ill-advised to dramatically overhaul anti-
trust law in order to more dispositively address these cases. Antitrust
law has proven remarkably effective at addressing the overwhelming
majority of competition issues that arise in our economy. It is the
crown jewel of our industrial policy, and the Magna Carta of our free
enterprise system. We should be cautious about dramatically chang-
ing it in the interest of pursuing certainty in the cases that arise at
the margin of current doctrine.
At the same time, there is some intuitive feeling that these cases
are more frequent—and thus that the evolution of doctrine to respond
to them is exigent, not just important. Without doubt, “platform” in-
dustries, which very often present messy markets, have come to domi-
nate our economy: Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google—the
five companies collectively referred to as FAANG—are all examples of
firms that engage in myriad forms of indirect competition across dif-
ferent market segments, structuring their business in each individual
segment to maximize their average revenue across all segments.
More generally, ever since Ronald Coase told us that transaction
costs impose a lower limit on the size of a firm, economists have puz-
zled over what puts an upper limit on the size of a firm.46 One curious
hypothesis about the current moment in our economy is that the same
information and communications technologies created by AT&T and
IBM in the early twentieth century and Apple and Microsoft in the
late twentieth century have dramatically increased the maximum effi-
cient size of firms outside of the traditional technology sectors. Thus,
we have Amazon taking the retail market by the storm of scale, and
Netflix doing the same in the video entertainment market (and firms
like AT&T’s current incarnation struggling to redefine itself).
To the extent that either of these perspectives is correct—that plat-
form-based industries are increasingly important to the US economy
or that information and communications technology has dramatically
increased the maximum efficient size of firms in industries across the
economy to the point that many industries are now predisposed to
oligopolistic structures—one may fairly concede that some form of reg-
ulation may be necessary (even if only as a tax on these industries to
assuage the consumer of ill-founded concerns on monopoly abuses).
But such regulation should not be built on the back of, and at the ex-
pense of, existing antitrust law.
45. See infra notes 60–61 (discussing the inferences that lower courts have developed
following the Supreme Court’s Actavis opinion).
46. Per L. Bylund, The Firm vs. the Market: The Transaction Cost Theories of Coase
and Williamson Dehomogenized, 2015 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 12853 (arguing the
cost of governance as the upper limit).
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III. COMPETITION IN MESSY MARKETS
This Part asks why messy markets pose such a challenge for the
Court and for antitrust law. It starts by discussing how competition is
“supposed to work”—that is, models of competition in horizontal and
vertical markets. Complexity is added to this discussion when looking
at some (but certainly not all) of the ways that competition is different
in messy markets. Frequently, these messier forms of competition
may superficially seem anti-competitive. The discussion in this Part
ends by exploring how seemingly anti-competitive conduct in these
markets can, in fact, be pro-competitive.
A. Simple Competition in Simple Markets
Antitrust law is generally concerned with the horizontal or vertical
relationships between firms. Firms in a horizontal relationship are di-
rect competitors with one another, selling products that are generally
identified by consumers as similar enough to be substitutes for one
another. Coke and Pepsi are horizontal competitors—for most con-
sumers they are substantially similar and would be accepted as rough
substitutes for each other. Firms in a vertical relationship are gener-
ally part of a supply chain of complementary products and services.
Raw ore is an input into the aluminum refining industry that pro-
duces sheets of aluminum that are, in turn, an input into the can pro-
duction industry that produces cans that are, in turn, an input into
the soft drink industry.
Horizontal and vertical relationships are of interest to antitrust
law because in well-functioning, competitive markets, the horizontal
and vertical interactions between firms tend to benefit consumers—
and, conversely, a disruption of such interactions can harm consum-
ers. Because the Coca-Cola Company knows that consumers view
Pepsi as a rough substitute for Coke, the company knows that if it
wants to make money it needs to offer consumers either a lower cost or
higher quality product. And Pepsi knows the same. So both Coca-Cola
and Pepsi are constantly trying to improve the quality or lower the
prices of their respective products. The defining concern of antitrust
law is that horizontal competitors like Coke and Pepsi will collude,
agreeing not to compete so that they can raise their prices (or lower
their quality), which will allow them to increase their profits by harm-
ing consumers.
Competition in vertical markets is more complicated but similarly
canonical—and ultimately reduces to horizontal competition. Firms at
each stage in a vertical supply chain face horizontal competition from
other firms at that same stage, so they are constantly working to
lower their costs or improve their quality. The additional considera-
tion in the vertical context is that a firm may be able to hurt its hori-
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zontal competitors by affecting the supply chain. For instance, if Coca-
Cola were able to buy up all of the aluminum ore (or just the lowest-
cost ore), or to enter an exclusive deal for refined aluminum from the
largest refiners, it may be able to increase Pepsi’s production costs.47
This leads to concerns that firms will compete with their horizontal
rivals by trying to increase those rivals’ costs or reducing their quality
(e.g., by forcing them to use lower-quality materials for cans). Unlike
competition that lowers costs or increases quality, this approach to
competition would harm consumers instead of benefiting them.
The vast majority of firms are in neither a horizontal nor a vertical
relationship with one another. Coca-Cola and Ford, for instance, do
not compete with one another. Because what happens in one of these
firms has exceptionally little (if any) impact on the other, antitrust
law does not touch the agreements between them. This would even be
true if, for instance, Coca-Cola entered into a deal with Ford to paint
new Ford trucks “Coca-Cola Red” at the same time that Pepsi entered
into a deal with Toyota to put pictures of Toyota cars on its cans.
B. More Complex Competition in Messier Markets
While antitrust law is largely focused on horizontal and vertical
markets, the reality is that the relationship between most firms is not
clearly either horizontal or vertical. And, similarly, most contempo-
rary precedential antitrust litigation does not fall squarely into either
camp.48 Indeed, there is some measure of irony in the extent to which
contemporary antitrust analysis is driven by the structure of firms
within the market, given the extent to which it developed in response
to the failures of the earlier SCP model. Contemporary antitrust law
outperforms the SCP model along nearly every dimension—but it is
nonetheless built upon structural presumptions that do not capture
the realities of most markets.
Most markets are messier than simple characterizations of hori-
zontal and vertical competition allow, and the modalities of competi-
tion in them are similarly messier. To take but one example, most
“horizontal” competition involves differentiated and even monopolistic
markets. There are significant differences between the cars that Ford
and Toyota and Porsche and Tesla sell, from price to quality to suita-
bility to different tasks. At some level, an F150 pickup truck is a com-
47. For a discussion of the economic theory of raising rival costs, see Steven C. Salop
& David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals Costs: Recent Advances in the Theory of
Industrial Structure, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).
48. Importantly, this could be either because cases involving such firms are more
likely to present complicated antitrust issues that can only be resolved through
litigation or because the antitrust rules governing firms more clearly in horizon-
tal or vertical relationships are sufficiently clear that litigation is unlikely to
result.
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petitor to a Tesla. At the same time, they are in many ways not
competitors at all. This is a standard form of competition—one often
called (contradictorily enough) monopolistic competition. Rather than
competing to offer the best or cheapest of near-perfect substitutes,
firms compete by offering the only of a unique offering within a class
of products. At each point along the continuum between a pickup
truck, an SUV, a hatchback, a coupe, a Prius, and a Tesla, we find
competitive substitutes; at each point we also find “best-in-class” prod-
ucts that are clearly superior to the offerings from competitors. De-
spite the pickup and Tesla being only one or two consumers away from
being direct competitors, few consumers would seriously consider
them even the same product. Are Ford and Tesla competitors?
One can go through myriad iterations of this question. Are soy milk
and cow milk (also known as “milk”) competitors? Are satellite radio
and terrestrial radio competitors? What about AM and FM radio?
Does Netflix compete with HBO? I can even think of one consumer
(me) who would say that Coke and beer are closer competitors than
Coke and Pepsi.
And, in many markets, competition is even more complicated—
and, critically, this comes with the challenge that it is also more com-
plicated to understand. This calls to mind Ronald Coase’s famous quip
that “if an economist finds something—a business practice of one sort
or other—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly expla-
nation.”49 For instance, firms regularly increase revenues through
price discrimination—that is, by charging consumers who they iden-
tify as willing to pay more for their products more than they charge
others. Price discrimination has an icky feeling, and a terrible name.
But the reality is that by charging more to customers that are willing
to pay more (knowingly or not), a firm is able to charge less to custom-
ers who are unable to pay more. For example, by charging exception-
ally high prices (that cover both fixed and variable costs of operating
an airplane) to business class customers, airlines are able to charge
economy class customers lower fares (that only cover their operating
costs). Similarly, because it can be more costly to offer service to multi-
ple categories of customers (e.g., professional and amateur), firms can
reduce their costs by imposing costs one group of consumers as part of
focusing on another group, which allows them to offer a better or lower
cost service to that other group. Intuitively, that may suggest that the
first group is harmed—but this creates opportunities for other firms to
cater to that other group.50
49. R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 POLICY ISSUES
AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (Victor R.
Fuchs ed., National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1972).
50. Note that with this strategy we have effectively recreated product differentiation!
Some consumers may find it objectionable that Tesla does not sell a battery-pow-
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Another example of such messy competition is firms competing to
achieve efficient scale. Many industries are characterized by high ini-
tial costs to get into a market, followed by decreasing average costs as
those initial fixed costs are amortized across a growing customer base.
It may cost $10,000 to buy a commercial pizza oven, but that oven may
be able to cook 200 pizzas a night. In markets like these firms may
compete to increase scale even more than they compete on more tradi-
tional quality or price metrics. And, indeed, in such markets it may be
preferable for consumers to have fewer than more firms competing,
because ultimately it’s the consumers who will be paying for those
pizza ovens.
This leads to a last example that complexifies the competition in
vertical markets. Antitrust law typically treats vertically-related
firms as complementary, not as substitutes—and therefore not as
competitors. But every firm faces a make-or-buy choice with its suppli-
ers. A firm like Coca-Cola, which depends significantly on aluminum
cans for its business, can either contract with a can manufacturer or it
can produce its own cans. This means that every firm is a potential
competitor to the firms that it buys from or sells to. As with the con-
tinuum of competition between Ford and Tesla, it is unlikely that
Coca-Cola would get into the aluminum mining business—but there is
potential competition across any given margin of the aluminum can
supply chain.
This is not an exhaustive set of examples by any means. Such a
list, in fact, would be contradictory to the purpose of this discussion.
Competition in most markets is more complicated than is captured by
the models of conduct in simple horizontal or vertical markets. In
most markets, seemingly anti-competitive conduct actually results
from, and is necessary to, how firms compete, and this competition is
ultimately beneficial to consumers. Conversely, there are times in
which seemingly competitive conduct disrupts competitive structures
and is ultimately harmful to consumers. No one ever said that anti-
trust is easy—and anyone who thinks it is easy is probably doing it
wrong.
C. American Express: The Competition Is in the Pudding
American Express is, unsurprisingly, an example of the messy and
counter-intuitive competition described above. On its face, American
Express’s anti-steering requirement seems like a clear agreement in
restraint of trade: it is an agreement that prohibits merchants from
ered pickup truck. But if Tesla were to try to do that, they would probably end up
offering both low quality trucks and lower quality cars (compared to their current
offerings), leaving few people better off and many worse off.
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steering consumers to competitive alternatives that cost both consum-
ers and the merchants themselves less.
It does not take much, however, to see that there are potential pro-
competitive and pro-consumer justifications for American Express’s
anti-steering requirements. As an initial matter, American Express
only has about a 22% share of the credit card processing market—it
has nowhere near significant market share, especially compared to
Visa (which has more than 50% market share).51 This lack of market
power tells us a few things. First, both merchants and consumers have
alternatives to using American Express. Few consumers have only an
American Express card, and almost no merchants accept only Ameri-
can Express. If American Express were not creating value for both
merchants and consumers, they would not be able to maintain even
their current market share.
Rather, American Express has competed for consumers by offering
higher-value rewards to their customers. As with Ford and Tesla,
American Express offers a differentiated product, targeting higher-in-
come consumers by offering them higher-value rewards. Indeed, while
this has long been American Express’s strategy, in recent years Visa
and MasterCard have also attempted to attract the same customers,
with the result being significant competition between the three com-
panies.52 One need only look at the business news coverage of the
credit card industry over the past decade to see how much competition
there is for consumers.
To see the nature of competition on the merchant side of the mar-
ket, one need only ask why merchants would bother accepting Ameri-
can Express cards at all. After all, most consumers that have
American Express cards have other cards as well, and all merchants
know that they pay higher fees to accept American Express credit
cards. The answer is simply that accepting American Express cards is
valuable to merchants. For instance, by advertising that one accepts
American Express, one is advertising to American Express cardhold-
ers, who are generally understood to be higher-income consumers.
One could spend that same money purchasing advertising or moving
51. AmEx is Likely to Become the Second Largest U.S. Card Processing Company this
Year, FORBES (May 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/
2018/05/29/amex-is-likely-to-become-the-second-largest-u-s-card-processing-com
pany-this-year/#2cf2d3264fa0 [https://perma.unl.edu/5YVX-BSPQ].
52. Robert Harrow, Consumers Win Big as Banks Compete on Credit Cards, FORBES
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertharrow/2016/04/07/consumers-
win-big-as-banks-compete-on-credit-cards/#2a9bb3714412 [https://perma.unl
.edu/4HY3-W4B4]; AnnaMaria Andriotis & Emily Glazer, Rewards Credit Cards
Gained a Fanatic Following—Now Banks Are Pulling Back, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 1,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rewards-credit-cards-gained-a-fanatic-follow
ingnow-banks-are-pulling-back-11546365926 [https://perma.unl.edu/MFD9-
SVNC].
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to a higher-cost retail district. The choice to pay higher merchant fees
is part of a merchant’s decision about how to maximize new revenue.
Similarly, indicating that one accepts American Express is an indica-
tor to consumers that a merchant is profitable and therefore more
likely a high-quality merchant. Just as some merchants hire more
knowledgeable (and most costly employees), the ability of a merchant
to pay higher transaction fees can be a valuable indicator that the cus-
tomer is getting a good value money.53
The purpose of the anti-steering provision is to prevent free rid-
ing—to prevent merchants from getting the benefits of advertising
that they accept American Express but then not paying for the costs of
those benefits. Doing so undermines American Express’s ability to of-
fer its differentiated product and ultimately would cause the market
to unravel and consolidate into a blended equilibrium in which either
American Express-style products are not offered, or in which those
merchants who do not free ride would face even higher merchant fees.
The story is even worse for consumers. American Express users would
face both higher fees and the uncertainty of not knowing whether a
merchant advertising that they accept American Express is a high-
quality, non-steering merchant, or a low-quality, free riding merchant.
Importantly, the alternative world—which is the world in which
we currently live, in which anti-steering provisions are enforceable—
is not a world in which non-American Express consumers are necessa-
rily harmed. By and large, non-American Express consumers can shop
at almost any store. Indeed, in some markets they may even be able to
get discounts by paying cash instead of credit.54 Some consumers may
themselves choose to free ride on the American Express brand, choos-
ing to shop at stores that accept the card that they do not have and
expecting those stores to be higher quality than those that do not ac-
cept American Express. Other consumers may choose to avoid stores
that accept American Express, on the expectation that such stores will
offer slightly lower prices. And it is important that merchants are free
to not accept American Express—and even to advertise this fact. One
could imagine a company competing by advertising on its storefront:
“We save you money because we don’t accept American Express”—and
one could even imagine Visa or MasterCard providing the materials
for these ads.
This is all to say that even though American Express’s anti-steer-
ing provision may seem on its face a clear example of a harmful re-
53. Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal, 92 J. POL.
ECON. 427 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Melissa Klein & Dean Balsamini, New Yorkers Are Furious Over Sneaky
Credit Card Surcharges, N.Y. POST (Apr. 27, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/04/
27/new-yorkers-are-furious-over-sneaky-credit-card-surcharges/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/Z63P-EECC].
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straint on trade, it may in fact be a pro-competitive restraint that
facilitates competition along margins more important than merchant
transaction fees, and ultimately yields a more diverse range of product
offerings targeted to a more diverse range of consumers.
IV. THE MANY SIDES OF AMEX ’S RIGHTNESS
The takeaway from Part III is that competition is complicated, es-
pecially in messy markets. Frequently, seemingly anti-competitive
conduct is actually beneficial to consumers—and seemingly pro-con-
sumer conduct can, in fact, be harmfully anti-competitive. The facts of
American Express demonstrate both of these circumstances.
The discussion in Part III suggests that the Court reached the cor-
rect result on the facts of the case.55 But the Court’s opinion is broader
than the facts of the case, holding that plaintiffs making out their
prima facie case must consider all sides of a market where the impacts
of indirect network effects between those sides are not minor.56 Here,
too, the Court’s opinion is sound. As discussed below, as a matter of
practice and procedure, as well as the development of antitrust law,
this allocation of burden leads to the substantively best outcomes.
A. A Burden Best Born by Plaintiffs
Perhaps the most contentious criticism of the Court’s opinion in
American Express argues that it effectively established per se legality
for conduct in multi-sided markets, and in particular that this effec-
tively immunizes large tech platforms from antitrust liability.57 The
basic gist of these arguments is that requiring plaintiffs to take into
consideration the effects of conduct on and across all sides of a multi-
sided market places an impossible burden on them. While in principle
an antitrust claim may be viable, the argument is that the Court’s
opinion in American Express makes such claims impossible in
practice.
55. More precisely, because the lower courts only considered the affirmative case
against American Express based upon its agreements on one side of the market
but did not consider the pro-competitive justifications for those agreements, the
factual record in the case did not support a finding that plaintiffs had met their
burden of proof.
56. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018) (“[C]ourts must include
both sides of the platform—merchants and cardholders—when defining the
credit-card market.”).
57. Tim Wu, The Supreme Court Devastates Antitrust Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/opinion/supreme-court-american-ex
press.html [https://perma.unl.edu/E8QY-NLQA]; Lina M. Kahn, The Supreme
Court Case That Could Give Tech Giants More Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/the-supreme-court-case-that-could-
give-tech-giants-more-power.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5DV4-9CVG].
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This argument is unavailing for at least three reasons. First, as a
general matter, American law generally places the burden of estab-
lishing a viable claim on the plaintiff. This is seen in the so-called
“Twiqbal” cases—one of which (Twombly) is, coincidentally enough,
an antitrust case.58 Twombly held that a civil antitrust claim “re-
quires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to sug-
gest that” the relevant antitrust law was violated.59 Iqbal expands
upon Twombly outside of the antitrust context, explaining that:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. . . . Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . . . [W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the
pleader is entitled to relief.60
Although the Court did not frame its analysis in American Express
in these terms (because the case was not about a motion to dismiss),
the holding is nonetheless consistent with it. Pleading facts that (if
taken as true) demonstrate conduct that could be anti-competitive if
constrained to one side of a two-sided market only demonstrates the
possibility of anti-competitive conduct—that someone did something
that might have violated the law. It is akin to alleging that someone
was driving really fast without including the speed limit, or that a
vendor cancelled an order without alleging that they were under an
obligation to fulfill it.
American Express’s anti-steering agreement may not violate anti-
trust law if analyzed from the perspective of both sides of the mar-
ket—the complete multi-market analysis is not a mere pro-
competitive justification or affirmative defense that justifies otherwise
harmful conduct, but an abnegation of the alleged harm necessary to
demonstrate anti-competitive conduct. Alleging anti-competitive con-
duct on only one side of the market, therefore, fails to meet the plausi-
bility requirement necessary to survive a motion to dismiss under
Twiqbal. While the American Express case did not arise from a motion
to dismiss, it is nonetheless the case that it is implausible to argue
that an evidentiary burden that would allow a claim that could not
survive a motion to dismiss is sufficient to carry a claim through
judgment.
Second, even if the Court were to allow plaintiffs to plead harm on
a single side of a multi-sided market, the net result of the rule of rea-
son process would be to require the plaintiff to make out a claim sus-
tainable across all sides of the market. The defendant would offer its
58. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
59. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
60. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (citations omitted).
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multi-sided analysis in response to the single-sided allegation, and the
parties would proceed iteratively back and forth through discovery
and motion practice until the case was heard before a judge. To the
extent that multi-sided claims can be made out, the outcome is the
same. To the extent that they impose an impossible burden on plain-
tiffs (or defendants), that burden will ultimately remain an impossible
hill to overcome.
Here, the subsequent history of the Court’s Actavis opinion is in-
structive. In that case, the Court expressly did not specify what was
necessary for parties to allege to demonstrate a claim under the rule of
reason in reverse patent settlement cases, instead leaving it to the
lower courts to determine what parties had to plead in order to make
out viable claims under the rule of reason.61 Over the subsequent
years, the lower courts did just this, hearing cases that gave rise to
inferences used to ascertain the plausibility of anti-competitive harm
arising from the sort of conduct at issue in Actavis.62
More generally, as between placing significant (or even impossible)
burdens on plaintiffs as opposed to defendants in antitrust cases, an
error-costs analysis (or even just simple statistics) strongly suggests
that it is better to err on the side of disadvantaging plaintiffs in rule of
reason cases over disadvantaging defendants. The alternative to plac-
ing the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate harm in what are often
novel, new technology industries, using new and rapidly developing
economic theories, is to place that same burden on defendants. But
these economic theories generally develop over generations of aca-
demic work, and that is the right setting for these theories to evolve.
The courtroom is not the right place to adjudge their validity, and a
judge is not the right party to do the work of academic reviewers.
This argument is strongly supported by statistics on the disposi-
tion of rule of reason cases. Michael Carrier has compiled extensive
statistics on the outcomes of these cases. His statistics show that (de-
pending on the period) in between 84% (1977–1999) and 97%
(1999–2009) of cases plaintiffs fail to demonstrate anti-competitive ef-
fect under the first step of the rule of reason.63 In the majority of the
small fraction of cases that do survive this first step, defendants are
61. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 160 (2013) (leaving it to the
lower courts to structure the rule of reason analysis of reverse patent settlement
cases).
62. See Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, The Ac-
tavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 585 (2015).
63. Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 1265; Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for
the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009) [hereinafter Empirical
Update].
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able to provide a pro-competitive justification for their conduct.64 Only
in a small fraction of cases have courts historically even reached the
point of balancing pro- and anti-competitive effects.65
In other words, plaintiffs have an exceptionally bad track record of
pleading competitive harms, and defendants have a strong track re-
cord of demonstrating pro-competitive justifications for the small frac-
tion of conduct that does have anti-competitive effect. This strongly
suggests that courts, when faced with novel allegations of anti-com-
petitive harmful conduct, should view plaintiff claims with skepticism
and place any heightened burden on plaintiffs as opposed to
defendants.
B. Economic Theory as a Question of Law or of Fact?
A related issue is the interaction of antitrust economics and anti-
trust law, and how the evolution of antitrust economics over time
translates into antitrust law. Antitrust law is unique among areas of
federal law in that it continues to develop through common law mech-
anisms, and particularly in that it continues to develop to keep apace
of the ongoing evolution of economic theory.66 But, had the Court’s
opinion in American Express gone the other way—and, in particular,
had it tracked Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion—the outcome of
rule of reason analysis would have been fact-bound and, therefore, ef-
fectively unreviewable. This, in turn, would have effectively led to sta-
sis in antitrust law, leaving it to lower courts to interpret the current
state of the art in antitrust economics without those interpretations
being reflected in broader antitrust doctrine.
The peril of this approach is seen in the district court’s opinion in
this case—and Justice Breyer’s adherence to the factual findings in
that opinion. The lower court framed its opinion entirely in terms of a
single side of the market and purported to find anti-competitive effects
based solely on those findings. The incoherence of these findings—
that is, that American Express’s anti-steering requirements do not
harm consumers and have substantial pro-competitive functions—is
demonstrated in Part III, above. But it was demonstrated even more
poignantly when Justice Kennedy asked at oral argument: “Does out-
put include premiums or rewards to consumers?” and counsel for the
64. Empirical Update, supra note 62, at 827 (explaining that they fail to do so in 3%
of cases in the 1977–1999 period, and 0.5% of cases in the 1999–2009 period).
65. Id. (finding courts reached the point of balancing pro- and anti-competitive effects
in 4% of cases in the 1977–1999 period, and 2% of cases in the 1999–2009 period).
66. See, e.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1191 (2014); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Common Law for the Twenty-
First Century, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 635 (2009); William F. Baxter, Separation of
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust
Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1982).
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states responded, “Yeah.”67 If the plaintiff does not have a burden to
plead all sides of a multi-sided market, the factfinder has the preroga-
tive to find that effects on other sides of the market are not relevant to
the antitrust harm. The result is that lower court judges can find anti-
competitive effects, as a matter of fact, that would not be supportable
were they required, as a matter of law, to consider all sides of the
market. The different standards of review—and, in general, the broad
deference given to the finder of fact over questions of fact—both ham-
pers the development of antitrust law and places an indefensible bur-
den on defendants to prove their conduct is not anti-competitive (a
burden whose contrapositive should be places on plaintiffs).
This is precisely the dynamic that was seen in American Express,
where Justice Breyer suggested that the district court need not have
considered evidence of pro-competitive justifications from conduct on
the other side of the market,68 and would have given significant
weight to the district court judge’s finding of “direct evidence”—a find-
ing that would have precluded any need for the lower court to consider
the definition of the market at all.69 Erroneous analysis such as this is
particularly likely in multi-sided markets where the very nature of
the market is that the platform, in order to maximize the value of the
platform for all users, will charge above-marginal cost prices on one
side of the market to cross-subsidize below-marginal cost prices on the
other side of the market. A judge looking at either side of such a mar-
ket could find direct evidence of anti-competitive conduct by virtue of
platform charging above- or below-marginal cost prices. Leaving such
cases subject to review only for clearly erroneous factual error is a rec-
ipe for multiple error costs—this, in addition to such an approach sti-
fling the development of antitrust law to match evolving economic
theory.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern economy is built around markets that are structurally
more complicated than those around which antitrust law has devel-
oped. As technology has broken down vertical production chains and
enabled new forms of interactions across platforms, the hard ques-
67. Transcript of Oral Argument in Ohio v. Am. Express Co. at 12:5–7, SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral
_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-1454_f2ah.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/AVM6-SVYZ].
68. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“A
Sherman Act § 1 defendant can rarely, if ever, show that a pro-competitive bene-
fit in the market for one product offsets an anticompetitive harm in the market
for another.”).
69. Id. at 2296 (“[A] discussion of market definition was legally unnecessary at step
1. That is because the District Court found strong direct evidence of anticompeti-
tive effects . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
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tions of antitrust law increasingly involve firms moving laterally
across their vertical silos into those of their competitors or facilitating
horizontal interactions between market participants by means of their
intermediary platforms.
This creates challenges for antitrust law. Contemporary, Cartesian
antitrust law is very good at addressing competitive issues in tradi-
tional horizontal and vertical markets. The relative paucity of anti-
trust litigation involving such markets demonstrates this well. But it
is not well tailored to addressing concerns that may arise in post-Car-
tesian markets. Much, possibly most, contemporary antitrust litiga-
tion deals with how to adapt antitrust law to address concerns that
may arise in these markets. This challenge is fraught with error costs:
how to disambiguate anti- and pro-competitive conduct in these mar-
kets and to curtail the former without jeopardizing the latter, and how
to do this without harming antitrust law’s current effectiveness in
simpler horizontal and vertical markets.
The best approach may be caution: do not break current antitrust
law in a vain attempt to address competitive concerns that are beyond
what antitrust law is suited to address. Such an approach is sure to
dissatisfy those who feel antitrust law must be a universal hammer, a
tool that can be wielded against any competitive harm. But antitrust
law, like a hammer, is necessarily a blunt tool. Surely economic theory
will continue to evolve and improve our understanding of conduct in
these messier markets. As it does, antitrust law may develop greater
ability to address competition concerns that surely can arise in such
markets. But it is up to economics to answer these questions and the
law to follow. The alternative only risks creating a greater mess.
